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NSC FOR LOOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019

TAGS: [PARM](#)

SUBJECT: STATE/VCI PDAS LOOK'S MEETINGS WITH CANADIAN,  
FRENCH, BRITISH, AND PAKASTANI CD AMBASSADORS

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

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SUMMARY  
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11. (C) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Karin L. Look, used the opportunity of being in Geneva to meet bilaterally with the Canadian, French, British, and Pakistani Ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on September 30, 2009. Her conversations with the Canadian, French, and British Representatives were wide-ranging, but focused on the current issue of the CD Program of Work (POW) and our collective desire to move ahead on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations. Look's meeting with Pakistani Ambassador Akram was solely on the matter of Pakistan blocking consensus on the CD's POW regarding negotiation of the FMCT. Look opened the meeting by expressing the view that Pakistan would better serve its interests by shaping FMCT negotiations in the CD through its participation instead of blocking CD work on this important initiative. Amb Akram reacted with a lengthy description of Pakistan's national security concerns related to the POW and the FMCT, in particular, the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Agreement with India and the asymmetry of Pakistani and Indian fissile material stockpiles. He also reiterated Pakistan's view that the CD POW should include a balanced approach to all four of the CD's core issues: the FMCT, prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances.

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Meeting with the Canadian Ambassador  
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12. (U) The meeting took place at the Canadian Mission in Geneva at 10:30 A.M. on September 30, 2009. Canadian participants were: Marius Grinius, Canadian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Office of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament; and Geoff Gartshore, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada. U.S. participants

were: Karin L. Look, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; Neil Couch, Deputy Director, Office of Strategic Issues; and Duke Lokka, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.

13. (C) Regarding Pakistan's decision to block consensus on the CD's POW, Grinius offered his opinion that Akram did not personally support this decision but was merely implementing instructions from Islamabad. He added that resolving this problem would require work in capitals. Look responded that, in her view, resolving this impasse with Pakistan and negotiating an FMCT could be the CD's last chance to prove its value. Grinius agreed, adding that it was time to look at the entire UN disarmament machinery. Grinius used the CFE (not a CD issue) as an example in explaining his view that it was important to continue to engage with the Russian military and that there has been no change in the Russian "psyche" since the end of the Cold War. Shifting to bio-security and the BWC, Grinius said that bio-security is a huge issue for governments and that this is one area that has not been politicized. The military decided years ago that biological weapons had no real value, however, terrorists have probably not reached the same conclusion. In Grinius' view, the next BWC Review Conference (in 2 years) will be important to continue progress on this critical issue.

14. (C) The discussion turned to the President Obama's Prague vision, including the President's commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal so long as nuclear weapons exist, maintain deterrence for ourselves and our Allies, and pursue ratification of the CTBT. Look noted

that the Administration hopes that it will be able to get the Senate to consider the treaty on its merits. Grinius agreed with Look's assessment and noted that progress on CTBT will contribute to a successful NPT Review Conference. Grinius also noted that now would be a good time to reconsider the need for the NATO nuclear deterrent in Europe.

15. (C) Grinius said that he had recently met with Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration, Eric Schwartz, and that they had concluded that many issues, such as refugees, contribute to an environment that will allow for implementation of the President's vision. In Grinius' view there is one degree of separation among all these issues. Grinius closed by noting that he would be in Washington on October 22 and 23 to meet with Ambassador Susan Burk on NPT issues and with the Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction (ISN/CB).

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Meeting with the French Ambassador  
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16. (U) The meeting took place at the French Mission in Geneva at 2:00 P.M. on September 30, 2009. French participants were: Eric Danon, French Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament; and Sophie Maol-Makame, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of France. U.S. participants were: PDAS Look, Couch, and Alan Carlson, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.

17. (C) Look opened by asking Danon for his perspective on the CD. He replied that "the CD was the only place where you don't have negotiations on disarmament." He added that this is a big problem in that the CD does not reflect the state of play in New York. In his view, if the P-5 have agreed to negotiate an FMCT, a "small country" such as Pakistan should not be able to block progress. Danon said that he believes a breakthrough will happen and that it will be a bad signal to the world if nothing is done on the FMCT prior to next year's NPT Review Conference. We should not add to Pakistan's problems and we should not disrupt their fight on terrorism, but Pakistan needs the help of the international community. In Danon's view, there are probably three or four people in Islamabad who are making the decisions to block the FMCT and that a possible solution might be to conclude a Civilian Nuclear Fuel Agreement with Pakistan, similar to the one

recently concluded with India. He added that, since each of the P-5 has separate military assistance agreements with Pakistan, the P-5 should coordinate those programs to enhance Pakistan's security. Maol-Makame offered that China could play a key role in helping Pakistan. Danon responded that China and Pakistan both want more nuclear weapons and that China was only supporting the FMCT because they believed it would take at least ten years to negotiate the treaty and that, by then, China would have a sufficient stock of fissile material to meet its military needs.

¶18. (C) Look expressed the view that Pakistan should work to shape the FMCT negotiations not block them. She also said that if the CD cannot even begin work on FMCT then perhaps it cannot do anything. Danon responded that the CD was a "black hole of disarmament," but that Paris was not ready to abandon it. He added that, in his view, non-proliferation was a more serious problem than disarmament and that diplomats can finish the "disarmament job," implying that disarmament was all but done. Look asked Danon if he had received any feedback on last month's P-5 meeting in London, noting that it was a vigorous discussion and that even the Chinese delegation played an active role. Danon said that China is learning and beginning to talk. He closed by noting that while the P-3 has a strong relationship, China needs to find its place.

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Meeting with the British Ambassador  
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¶19. (U) The meeting took place at the British Mission in Geneva at 3:00 P.M. on September 30, 2009. British participants were: John Duncan, UK Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament; and Jo Adamson, Deputy Permanent Representative, UK Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament. U.S. participants were: PDAS Look, Couch, and Carlson.

¶10. (C) During this relatively brief and low-key meeting, Look and Duncan focused on the impasse in the CD on the POW, but also spoke in general terms about the President's nuclear agenda. Duncan said that, in his view, it will take high-level work in capitals to fix the FMCT problem in the CD. He noted that the CD was a "coalition of consent" and that we would have to make "common cause" with non-P-5 countries. As a former colonial power, the UK does not have much influence over Pakistan: Pakistan will not listen to the UK, so it is up to Washington to influence Islamabad. Look took his point, but added that the United States cannot be the only voice urging Pakistan to allow work to proceed on the FMCT in the CD. Look asked Duncan if he had any feedback on last month's UK-sponsored P-5 NPT meeting in London, noting that it was a vigorous and useful discussion and that even the Chinese delegation had played an active role. Duncan replied that China should start acting as part of the P-5 and stop protec

ting the Pakistanis.

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Meeting with the Pakistani Ambassador  
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¶11. (U) The meeting took place at the United Nations complex in Geneva at 4:00 P.M. on September 30, 2009. Pakistani participants were: Zamir Akram, Pakistani Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament; and Aftab Khokher, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations, Geneva. U.S. participants were: PDAS Look, Couch, and Carlson.

¶12. (C) Look began by expressing her pleasure that she and the Ambassador were able to meet on such short notice. She said that the United States wanted to reach out to Pakistan as we prepare the way for negotiations on an FMCT in the CD. The United States believes that the CD can be the right place

for the negotiation and that Pakistan's recent decision to impede that effort undercuts Pakistan's ability to shape the FMCT conversation. Look remarked that the best way for Pakistan to influence the content of this treaty is for us to begin negotiations on it in the CD very soon.

¶13. (S) Akram responded with a long and well articulated, albeit one-sided, description of Pakistan's position on the FMCT, its process for developing that position, and other factors that influence Pakistan's security. Akram stated that Pakistan has a robust and interactive interagency process to decide nuclear and strategic issues. Once those decisions were made, it was his job to implement his government's instructions in Geneva. He said pointedly that Pakistan made decisions based on its own national security interests. Acknowledging Look's mention of the President's Prague speech, Akram said that Islamabad was confused by its message and that prior to agreeing to the 2009 POW in the CD, Pakistan had received positive messages from Washington. Akram claimed that Pakistan had believed that work in the CD would proceed on all four of the CD's core issues: the FMCT, prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances. This was a comprehensive process that would benefit Pakistan. With the current "FMCT-only" approach, the United States has caused

Pakistan more problems than before, especially regarding the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Agreement (the 123 Agreement) with India and in dealing with the International Atomic Energy Agency. According to Akram, there is an asymmetry in Pakistani and Indian fissile material stockpiles and this asymmetry will become worse even if India does not cheat on the 123 agreement because India can divert existing civilian stocks of fissile material to military programs. Pakistan believes that it will take five to seven years before Indian reactors come under international safeguards and that, by then, the situation will be much worse.

¶14. (S) Akram also argued that in addition to the fissile material problem, Pakistan believes that the United States has been engaging with India to develop strategic capabilities, including an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program. He said that India already has an operational, if rudimentary, submarine-launched nuclear missile system and that India is receiving additional cooperation from Russia and Israel on its ABM program. He added that Israel was transferring U.S.-origin ABM technology to India and that a recent visit to India by the U.S. Secretary of State had produced agreements on cooperation in space and on conventional weapons. Akram said that Pakistan had studied India's strategic doctrine and that India believed it could fight and win a short and limited war with Pakistan. Pakistan believes that its security environment has deteriorated and that the U.S. view that the Taliban threat in the west is more significant than the Indian threat in the east concerns Pakistan. The Indian threat has not receded and the situation in Kashmir is real and has not gone away. Akram added that Pakistan has evidence that India is promoting terrorism in the west. It is not just the Taliban there, Pakistan has captured Indian citizens and weapons in Pakistan but the United States will not focus on this.

¶15. (S) In wrapping up his discourse, Akram said that all of these issues provide the context for its decisions regarding the CD. For the sake of Pakistani security, the CD must make progress on all four of the CD's core issues, but Akram claimed it faced resistance from the United States. Negative security assurances do not impact Pakistan because it has already committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and Pakistan wants all nuclear weapons states to make the same assurances. Pakistan is also concerned with India's space program and, according to Akram, India's lunar and martian programs are ruses for its anti-satellite program. Pakistan wants an FMCT that is a disarmament measure that actually eliminates excess stocks of fissile material and not simply a non-proliferation measure that legalizes the current state of affairs.

¶16. (S) Look concurred with Akram's point that every country must consider and act in accordance with its national interests. In this context, she said, Pakistan should consider influencing the content of an FMCT negotiation rather than blocking it. In that way, Pakistan can shape the conversation--and the outcome. The United States wants to find a way to get agreement on the POW so negotiations can begin early in 2010. Akram said that Pakistan looks forward to working with the United States in the CD but that it has a different perspective. He added that they were only one word away from agreement on the POW, which was that the POW must be "balanced." (Begin note from Carlson: During the 2009 CD session, Pakistan had insisted that the POW "ensure balanced outcomes," not merely be "balanced." Most CD member states expressed the view that the 2009 POW was, in fact, balanced. End note.) In his view, Akram said, political will was needed to move forward on all four of the CD's core issues. Pakistan had agreed to the 2009 POW and would reconsider the 2010 POW.

¶17. (S) In a parting message, Akram recounted that Pakistan had passed a warning to the United States in March 1998 that

its intelligence service was aware that India was about to conduct its first underground nuclear weapons test. Akram stated that the United States ignored Pakistan's warning and then was "surprised" by the test. Following this statement, Akram said that he believed that India may be preparing for another underground nuclear weapons test, referring to recent media statements by Dr. Santhanam, coordinator of the 1998 Indian nuclear test. He offered no further information regarding such a new test.

¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
RICHTER